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Part II
2019 Laskin Lecture

KEYNOTE ADDRESS
The U.S. Supreme Court’s Challenge
to Civil Society
Linda Greenhouse*

This keynote address was delivered at the Osgoode Hall Law School
2018 Constitutional Cases Conference by Linda Greenhouse, Pulitzer
prize winner and Joseph Goldstein lecturer in Law and Knight
Distinguished Journalist in Residence, Yale Law School on April 5, 2019.
I would like to begin by setting two texts side by side and inviting
you to compare them.
The first is a paragraph from Justice Potter Stewart’s opinion for the
U.S. Supreme Court in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,1 a labor
case decided in 1977 by a vote of 9-0. The question in the case was
whether public employees who chose not to join a labor union could
nonetheless be required to pay that portion of union dues that provided
the union with the resources to fulfil its duty to represent and bargain on
behalf of everyone in the bargaining unit — whether union members or
not.
I suspect this question will be familiar to this audience, assuming your
familiarity with an early Charter decision, Lavigne v. Ontario Public
Service Employees Union,2 decided in 1991. That case, like the American
case, arose as a claim for constitutional protection for free expression and
against compelled association — protections afforded by section 2 of the
Charter and by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution. In U.S. labour law terms, at issue in Abood was
the constitutionality of what was known as the “agency fee” system, under
*
Joseph Goldstein lecturer in Law and Knight Distinguished Journalist in Residence, Yale
Law School. An expanded version will appear in the 2020 issue of the [U.S.] Supreme Court
Review, published by the University of Chicago.
1
431 U.S. 209 (1977).
2
[1991] S.C.J. No. 52, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211 (S.C.C.).
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which no one had to join the union but all had to pay their fair share for
the benefits that all received; the objecting employees argued that the
system subjected them to an unconstitutional degree of “ideological
conformity”.
Justice Stewart, writing for the Supreme Court, acknowledged that
there could be many weighty reasons — political, ideological, even
religious — why an employee might object to the union’s activities or
even to its existence. Just as in the Canadian case, the Supreme Court
back in 1977 found the mandatory payments constitutional nonetheless.
Justice Stewart observed:
To be required to help finance the union collective-bargaining agent
might well be thought, therefore, to interfere in some way with an
employee's freedom to associate for the advancement of ideas, or to
refrain from doing so, as he sees fit. But ... such interference as exists is
constitutionally justified by the legislative assessment of the important
contribution of the union shop to the system of labor relations
established by Congress.
[and here Justice Stewart quoted from Justice William O. Douglas in an
earlier labor case.]
The furtherance of the common cause leaves some leeway for the
leadership of the group. As long as they act to promote the cause which
justified bringing the group together, the individual cannot withdraw
his financial support merely because he disagrees with the group's
strategy….3

The furtherance of a common cause. Hold that thought, please, as
I turn to my second text. First, a bit of context.
In January of this year, a federal district judge in Philadelphia granted
an injunction barring enforcement of new rules issued by the Trump
administration for the benefit of employers who have either religious
objections or “sincerely held” moral objections to contraception. These
employers were to be excused from the requirement in the Affordable
Care Act that all employee health plans cover birth control along with
other “preventive” services.4 The judge, Wendy Beetlestone, noted the
“remarkable” breadth of this exemption, which applies to for-profit as
well as non-profit businesses. She noted that Congress had in fact
3
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 at 222-223 (citing Machinists v.
Street, 367 U.S. 740, at 778, Douglas J. concurring).
4
Pennsylvania v. Trump, 351 F. Supp. 3d 791, 816 (E.D. Pa. 2019). Following five Interim
Final Rules, the Final Rule was issued on November 15, 2018. 83 Fed. Reg. 57,536.
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considered and rejected a broad “conscience” opt-out from the birth
control mandate. The new rule thus violated the “plain command” of the
statutory text, she concluded, and she observed that if enforced, the rule
would cause thousands of women who had the misfortune to work for
opting-out employers to lose the insurance coverage to which they were
legally entitled.
And now to my text: the response of the press secretary of the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services to Judge Beetlestone’s ruling.
“No American should be forced to violate his or her own conscience in
order to abide by the laws and regulations governing our health care,”
said Caitlin Oakley.5
The story I have to tell inhabits the space between Justice Stewart’s
invocation of our “common cause” and Ms. Oakley’s seeming
obliviousness to the welfare of thousands of American women who
happen to work for bosses who object to birth control. I argue that these
two texts stand as goalposts at either end of a playing field known as
civil society. If the two appear asymmetrical — one, a statement by the
Supreme Court in a published opinion, the other, a remark by a federal
bureaucrat in immediate response to breaking news — the asymmetry is
likely to be only temporary. Judge Beetlestone’s opinion, after an initial
appeal,6 is highly likely to reach the Supreme Court — a Court that only
three years ago found itself unable, following the death of Justice Scalia,
to decide the permissible scope of an accommodation to employers
unwilling to abide by the birth control mandate.7 The short-handed
Court’s stalemate in Zubik v. Burwell provided the gap that the Trump
administration’s broad exemptions now seek to fill. With the addition of
the new justices, Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh, there is reason to
expect that today’s Supreme Court will be willing and able, even eager,
to decide the question in favour of the conscience opt-outs.
And what would be the harm of that? The United States, after all, has a
proud tradition of protecting minorities who assert claims of conscience
against mainstream norms that would overwhelm or even crush
unconventional practices and belief systems. If the political system has
often failed to extend such protections, the courts have done so. Such

5
Associated Press, The Latest: Official Decries Blocking of Birth Control Rules, Jan. 13,
2019, online: <https://www.apnews.com/619b4cb94693436581ff39f8374f296e>.
6
Affirmed as Pennsylvania v. Trump, 930 F.3d 543 (3d Cir. 2019).
7
See Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016), 1560.
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Supreme Court decisions as Sherbert v. Verner,8 which protected a
Seventh-Day Adventist from having to work on his Sabbath; West Virginia
v. Barnette,9 holding that Jehovah’s Witness children did not have to salute
the American flag; and Wisconsin v. Yoder,10 which exempted the Amish
from having to send their children to high school, are well known to
anyone with a passing familiarity with the history of the First
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause. These decisions are celebrated as
symbols of American society’s commitment to freedom of conscience, of
the protection of conscience as an essential aspect of civil society. The
Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects religious claimants from employment
discrimination and requires employers to accommodate the needs of
religiously observant employees as long as the accommodation will not
impose undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.11
The conservative writer Ryan Anderson, in an argument against samesex marriage, observed that “religious liberty plays a crucial role in
preserving civil society as something separate from government”.12 Few
of us would argue with that statement as an expression of abstract
principle. But given recent developments in our politics and our law, we
needurgently to move from the abstract to the concrete. We need to
question whether conscience claims, as they are being expressed and
honored today, rather than embodying the best of civil society have
become a threat to it — and indeed, to the legitimacy of the modern state,
where laws of general applicability enacted through democratic politics
are assumed to apply to all.13

8

374 U.S. 398 (1963).
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
10
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
11
42 U.S.C. 2000e(j), 2000e2(a)(1) Justice Samuel Alito, in a statement joined by three
other justices, suggested recently that the statutory accommodation for religious employees, as
construed by the Supreme Court in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), is
insufficiently accommodationist. Assuming that Justice Alito is faithful to the practice described in
the remainder of this lecture, we will shortly see cases that raise this long-settled issue making their
way onto the Supreme Court’s docket. (Statement of Alito J., respecting the denial of certiorari,
Joseph A. Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, No. 18-12, 139 S. Ct. 634, Jan. 22, 2019.) On
March 18, 2019, the Court requested the views of the Solicitor General on a petition for certiorari
that explicitly asks the Court to overturn the 1977 precedent in favor of a broader accommodation
requirement. Patterson v. Walgreen Co., petition for cert. pending, No. 18-349.
12
Ryan T. Anderson, The Continuing Threat to Religious Liberty, Heritage Foundation,
Aug. 4, 2017, online: <https://www.heritage.org/religious-liberty/commentary/the-continuing-threatreligious-liberty>.
13
For a powerful explication of this idea, see Robert Post’s concluding chapter in the multi-author
book of essays, The Conscience Wars (Susanna Mancini & Michel Rosenfeld, eds.), 473-484 (2018).
9
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With that introduction, I want to focus our attention on the Supreme
Court, and to begin, on the most important decision of the Court’s last
term. That most important decision was not the failed challenge to the
Trump Muslim travel ban.14 It was not the case on the rights of the
Colorado baker who wouldn’t bake a cake for a same-sex couple’s
wedding celebration, although I will return to that case.15
It was a labor case, Janus v. American Federation of State, County
and Municipal Employees.16 The question in Janus was whether to
overrule our old friend, Abood v. Detroit Board of Education. To the
surprise of absolutely no one, that is what the Supreme Court did. For
reasons I will describe, that outcome — and even the vote of 5 to 4 —
had been expected for some years and was highly anticipated by the time
the case was decided last June 27. It did not go unnoticed, so I don’t
purport to be rescuing this decision from obscurity. But few people fully
comprehended just how radical Janus was, and how much it tells us
about the current Supreme Court, the state of our constitutional law, and
the emerging impact of the Court’s constitutional vision on American
society.
Janus is worth examining from several angles: First Amendment
doctrine, judicial behavior, practical impact. I will discuss these in order
to lay a foundation, so that we can see the case as a whole before I get to
the most important point: what the decision suggests about the Supreme
Court’s role in the fraying fabric of civil society.
I’ll begin briefly with the First Amendment. From today’s
perspective, the mediated view of the First Amendment the Court
expressed 42 years ago in Abood — that the First Amendment provides a
framework for balancing the collective interest of the state against the
interests of private speakers — seems to come to us from a different era.
It was an era when the First Amendment served to enable free and open
public discourse. It was an era before, for example, the Supreme Court
ruled in the 2011 case of Sorrell v. IMS Health17 that Vermont violated
the First Amendment rights of pharmaceutical companies when it barred
pharmacies from selling to the companies doctors’ prescription records
— records that enabled pharmaceutical sales people to make targeted
sales pitches to doctors for expensive new drugs for patients who were
14
15
16
17

Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
564 U.S. 552 (2011).
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being treated with inexpensive old ones. It was an era before the D.C.
Circuit ruled18 that tobacco companies have a First Amendment right not
to be required by federal regulators, implementing a 2009 Act of
Congress,19 to display on their packaging disturbing photographs of what
happens to people who smoke — a ruling the Obama administration
decided would be counter-productive to appeal to a Supreme Court that
was highly likely to affirm it.
(And early this year, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
relying on the Supreme Court’s most recent First Amendment precedents,
granted a preliminary injunction against enforcement of San Francisco’s
Sugar-Sweetened Beverage Warning Ordinance, which requires soda
advertisements to contain a warning that “Drinking beverages with added
sugar(s) contributes to obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay.” The required
warning also had to include the notice that: “This is a message from the
City and County of San Francisco.” There is little doubt that a few years
ago, this public health measure requiring the inclusion of truthful
information in a commercial advertisement would have been upheld. The
Ninth Circuit’s conclusion to the contrary was unanimous.)20
In other words, Abood was the product of an era before the First
Amendment was turned into a potent tool of deregulation, before it was,
in the words of Justice Elena Kagan’s dissenting opinion in Janus,
“weaponiz[ed]”.21 So when Justice Alito, writing for the majority in
Janus, said that Abood had become “an anomaly in our First Amendment
jurisprudence”,22 it was hard to argue with him.
The shorthand for what Justice Stewart offered as the rationale for
Abood came to be known as the “free rider” problem — the notion that
peace in the workplace would be threatened by the presence of fellow
workers who were not paying their fair share. It is worth noting that a
series of decisions following Abood made clear that the fair-share
obligation extended only to the expenses of collective bargaining and
representation. Employees could opt out of paying for expenses
connected with a union’s political advocacy; few questioned that
distinction as a matter of law or policy. But the Janus majority found any
18

R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F. 3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-31
Sec. 201, 123 Stat. 1776, 1845 (2009).
20
American Beveridge Assoc. v. City and County of San Francisco, Ninth Cir., No. 1616073 (Jan. 31, 2019).
21
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
22
Id., at 2483.
19
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such distinction unworkable as a means of solving what it viewed as the
central problem of coerced speech. As Justice Alito explained:
“Petitioner strenuously objects to this free-rider label. He argues that
he is not a free rider on a bus headed for a destination that he wishes to
reach but is more like a person shanghaied for an unwanted voyage.”23
The impact of Janus is considerable, extending well beyond the labor
context. For example, the Court’s analysis has invited a new round of
litigation against mandatory bar dues and bar membership. The justices
considered one such case this term, a challenge to mandatory bar
membership in North Dakota.24 That case was filed before Janus, clearly
in expectation of Janus’s outcome. The justices took the case up in their
private conference eight times during the fall, before finally vacating the
Eighth Circuit decision below, which had upheld the compulsory bar
membership, and remanding the case to the appeals court for
reconsideration in light of Janus. While the Court’s docket-setting
function is notably opaque, it is clear from the many times the justices
are listed as having discussed this petition at their weekly private
conference that the disposition was controversial inside the Court. It is
highly likely that some members of the Court were eager to take up the
bar dues case immediately, without waiting for the lower courts to decide
how to apply Janus to related challenges. There will be other such cases
in the pipeline in short order.
And of course Janus will exact a substantial price from public
employee unions, which under the legal duty of fair representation25 will
have to continue doing their work on behalf of non-members and
members alike, even as their dues revenue shrinks. It is no coincidence
that public employee unions have been a target of political and judicial
conservatives. Even as union membership in the private sector shrinks
almost to invisibility, standing now at 10 per cent, union membership is
actually quite robust in the public sector, where more than one-third of
employees are union members.26 Further, public sector unions tend to
skew progressive. They support Democrats.
In the wake of Janus, there are lawsuits seeking to claw back agency
fees that have already been paid. One such case was recently dismissed
23

Id., at 2466.
Fleck v. Wetch, 139 S. Ct. 590, No. 17-886, granted, vacated and remanded to the Eighth
Circuit in light of Janus, Dec. 3, 2018.
25
Grace Shaver Figg, The Union Duty of Fair Representation: Fact or Fiction, 60
Marquette L.R. 1116 (1977).
26
See <https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm>.
24
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in the federal district court in Seattle; the judge declared that the union
was entitled to a “good faith” defense, since the dues were constitutional
at the time the union collected them.27 But other such cases are pending,
and may find friendlier judicial audiences.
What does Janus tell us about the Roberts Court? I think we can
conclude without exaggeration that it tells us that no precedent is safe.
Janus provides a roadmap for how to hollow out a precedent so
completely that a baby’s breath can deliver the final blow. And I can’t
emphasize enough the extent to which overturning Abood was Samuel
Alito’s project. Here, in brief, is how he did it. The story is illuminating.
It began in 2012 with a case called Knox v. Service Employees
International Union.28 The question was a very narrow one: how the
union should have treated a special dues assessment, and what
accommodation it should have offered to objecting members of the
bargaining unit. But Justice Alito, in a decision signed by five justices,
went beyond the question presented to place Abood squarely in the
Court’s sights. “… our prior decisions approach, if they do not cross, the
limit of what the First Amendment can tolerate”, he wrote. In any future
case, he added, “The general rule — individuals should not be compelled
to subsidize private groups or private speech — should prevail.”
This was, of course, an invitation to bring the Court just such a
“future case”. One arrived two years later. Harris v. Quinn,29 another 5 to
4 decision with a majority opinion by Justice Alito, held that Abood did
not apply in the context of unionized home health workers, due to an
employer-employee relationship that is very different from the
relationship in a conventional workplace. Justice Alito went further than
necessary to decide the question presented, his attack on Abood
becoming more direct. Abood was questionable from the start, he wrote.
The Abood court “failed to appreciate the conceptual difficulty” of the
fact that in the public sector, “both collective bargaining and political
advocacy and lobbying are directed at the government”.30
Quinn had been brought to the court by the National Right to Work
Legal Defense Fund, which in its briefing asked the Court directly to
overrule Abood. That was not necessary, Justice Alito said — not
necessary yet. Justice Kagan, in an opinion for the four dissenters, saw
27
28
29
30

Danielson v. AFSCME, 340 F. Supp. 3d 1083 (W.D. Wash. 2018).
567 U.S. 298 (2012).
134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014).
Id., at 2632.
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what lay ahead. There was no principled distinction between this case
and Abood, she said, and therefore no need for the majority’s extended
discussion of Abood’s supposed deficiencies. “Today’s opinion takes the
tack of throwing everything against the wall in the hope that something
might stick.”31 It would stick soon enough.
The following year, 2015, Friedrichs v. California Teachers
Association32 reached the Supreme Court. This was the first case since
Justice Alito began his campaign that squarely presented the issue in a
posture that gave the Court a clear choice between reaffirming Abood or
overturning it. The litigation was financed by the conservative Lynde and
Harry Bradley Foundation through its grantee, the Center for Individual
Rights; Bradley also financed, at least in part, 11 of the organizations that
filed amicus briefs on the plaintiffs’ behalf at the Supreme Court.33
Friedrichs followed a very unusual path to the Court. In Federal
District Court, the plaintiffs did not contest the union’s motion for
summary judgment.34 Then, having lost in District Court according to
plan, the plaintiffs asked the Ninth Circuit to affirm their defeat.
Obliging, as settled law required, the appeals court affirmed in a one
paragraph order calling the case “so insubstantial as not to require further
argument”.35
Despite the absence of a conflict in the circuits (the ordinary marker
of an appeal deemed worthy of Supreme Court review36) the justices, not
surprisingly, agreed to hear the case. Argument took place in January
2016. By the end of the argument, it was perfectly clear that Abood
would be overturned by a vote of 5 to 4. Justice Alito, we can assume,37
received the assignment from Chief Justice Robert. He no doubt turned
quickly to the welcome task of drafting his majority opinion, his moment
finally at hand.

31

Id., at 2648 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016).
33
Brian Mahoney, Conservative Group Nears Big Payoff in Supreme Court Case, Politico,
Jan. 10, 2016, online: <https://www.politico.com/story/2016/01/friedrichs-california-teachers-unionsupreme-court-217525>. See also Senators Sheldon Whitehouse and Richard Blumenthal’s brief in
support of respondents, Janus v. AFSCME, at pp. 16-17.
34
2013 WL 9825479 @ *1.
35
Brief for Pets at *8-9, Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass’n., 135 S. Ct. 2933, No. 14-915
(U.S. Sept. 4, 2015).
36
Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States (2017), Rule 10(a).
37
Justice Alito proved to be the only justice without a majority opinion from the January
2016 argument sitting.
32
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Then, the next month, shockingly, Justice Scalia died. There would be
no majority opinion, not this time. By a 4-4 vote, the justices affirmed
the Ninth Circuit in a one-line order, without further discussion or
explanation. (A tie vote at the Supreme Court automatically affirms the
lower court opinion, without precedential weight; it is as if the case never
reached the Court.) Justice Alito would have to wait just a bit longer, but
not very long. Justice Gorsuch joined the Court in April 2017. The
National Right to Work Legal Defense Fund filed its cert petition in
Janus in June. The Court granted the petition on its opening day order
list at the start of the 2017 term that Fall.
Who is Mark Janus?
He didn’t start out as the plaintiff in this case. The first plaintiff was
the newly elected Illinois governor, Bruce Rauner, a Republican who had
run for office on an anti-union platform, backed by millions of dollars in
contributions from an Illinois businessman, Richard Uihlein, who also
helps fund the Federalist Society, the National Right to Work Legal
Defense Fund, and the Liberty Justice Center. With the state legislature
controlled by Democrats, Governor Rauner could make no headway with
legislation abolishing the agency shop. That is a step that is open to the
states, and in fact more than half the states had either never instituted or
had abolished the agency shop for their public employee unions. But that
option was not politically available to Governor Rauner, so he turned to
the courts. The Federal District Court threw a wrench into his plans,
however, dismissing the governor’s lawsuit for lack of standing.38 The
court then permitted Mark Janus, an Illinois state employee, to intervene
as the new plaintiff — strange in itself because there was no longer an
existing lawsuit in which to intervene. But no matter, the case —
Friedrichs redux — was soon, after a brief stop at the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,39 on its way to the Supreme Court.
The hurdle that Justice Alito and his five-member majority had to
overcome was, of course, stare decisis. Here was a decision, more than
four decades old, reaffirmed many times. What to do? Justice Alito did
something quite remarkable — he cited himself to show that any reliance
interest that attached to Abood had been erased — erased by his own
dicta. Listen:

38
39

Rauner v. AFSCME, USDC N.D. Ill. No. 15-cv-01235.
851 F. 3d 746 (7th Cir. 2017) (affirming dismissal of the amended complaint).
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… public sector unions have been on notice for years regarding this
Court’s misgivings about Abood. In Knox, decided in 2012, we described
Abood as a First Amendment “anomaly.” Two years later, in Harris, we
were asked to overrule Abood, and while we found it unnecessary to take
that step, we cataloged Abood’s many weaknesses.40

He went on to describe the fate of the Friedrichs case, deriving from
the tie vote the conclusion that the world should have discerned that the
end of Abood was at hand: “During this period of time, any public sector
union seeking an agency-fee provision in a collective-bargaining
agreement must have understood that the constitutionality of such a
provision was uncertain.”41
In her dissenting opinion, Justice Kagan called Justice Alito out, referring
to the Court’s “six-year campaign to reverse Abood”42 and observing that the
majority had found “no exceptional or special reason” for doing so.43 “It has
overruled Abood because it wanted to.”44 That is a remarkably explicit
statement for one justice to make about her colleagues. Justice Kagan
continued: “… the majority has chosen the winners by turning the First
Amendment into a sword and using it against workaday economic and
regulatory policy . . . The First Amendment was meant for better things.”45
I have delved at such length into the history of the Janus litigation to
make clear the aggressive nature of the Court’s attack on the status quo, a
status quo anchored in democratic accountability. As I mentioned, states
have been free from the beginning either to adopt the agency fee system
for their public employee unions or to reject it. Governor Rauner lacked
the political power to accomplish his goal by legislation, so he enlisted a
friendly Supreme Court.
The disjunction between the Court’s decision last June and the public
mood is worth noting. A Gallup poll conducted in early August 2018,
about a month after the Court’s ruling, showed public support for labor
unions at a 15-year high, at 62 percent.46 Schoolteachers in red as well as
blue states have staged successful strikes for higher pay and better
working conditions.47 To be sure, the fortunes of organized labor have
40

Janus, 138 S.Ct. 2484.
Id., at 2485.
42
Id., at 2487 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
43
Id., at 2497 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
44
Id., at 2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
45
Id., at 2501-02 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
46
Online: <https://news.gallup.com/poll/241679/labor-union-approval-steady-year-high.aspx>.
47
Robert Gebeloff, The Numbers That Explain Why Teachers Are in Revolt, N.Y. Times,
June 4, 2018.
41
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ebbed and flowed throughout U.S. history, in the courts as well as in
politics. Now we have entered an era when anti-union forces that can’t
prevail in politics will take refuge in the courts.
That is a problem for the legitimacy of the courts, to be sure. But my
point here is an even deeper one. What we are seeing in the Supreme
Court’s recent behavior is a threat to the foundations of civil society.
Earlier in this talk I asked you to keep in mind Justice Douglas’s phrase
as quoted by Justice Stewart, “the furtherance of a common cause”. Stepping
back from what Janus tells us about labor law or the First Amendment,
I think its primary injury is to further constitutionalize the notion that we as a
society are not in fact united in a common cause, that we can help ourselves
to an opt-out of our choice, that we are not all in this together.
There’s been much talk about the rise of tribalism in the United States and
elsewhere. We retreat to our living rooms where alternate visions of reality
greet us from across the airwaves, cable connections, and the Internet. It is
increasingly hard to sustain the structures of civil society under these
conditions. The Supreme Court once had an insight, as embodied by Abood
and the cases that followed it until very recent years, that while we may
disagree with one another, we are all playing by the same rules of democratic
accountability. Somehow American society managed to navigate, through
law, what Jeffrey Alexander calls “the seemingly oxymoronic commitment to
individuality and collectivity that defines the sphere of civil life”.48
When did we begin to lose navigational ability, that commitment to the
collectivity? It’ss not possible to pinpoint a moment, but it was certainly
well before the 2016 election. The story of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (“RFRA”)49 is instructive. Congress passed RFRA to
reject the Supreme Court’s 1990 decision, Employment Division v. Smith.50
In Smith the Court, by a vote of 5 to 4 and with a majority opinion by
Justice Scalia, rejected the argument that the Free Exercise Clause
mandates religious exemptions from a law of general applicability.
The case arose when the state of Oregon refused unemployment
benefits to two members of the Native American Church who had been
fired for using peyote in their religious ritual. Oregon law held that
people who become unemployed through violating a criminal statute
were not entitled to benefits. The plaintiffs claimed a right to the benefits
under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.
48
49
50

Jeffrey C. Alexander, The Civil Sphere (2006), 153.
42 U.S.C. 2000bb.
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia acknowledged that the men’s
claim was a sympathetic one that Oregon might well have chosen to
accommodate as, he noted, other states did in similar circumstances.
However, he concluded:
But to say that a nondiscriminatory religious practice exemption is
permitted, or even that it is desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally
required, and that the appropriate occasions for its creation can be
discerned by the courts. It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation
to the political process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious
practices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence
of democratic government must be preferred to a system in which each
conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social
importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.51

The decision alarmed religious communities across the spectrum from
the most liberal to the most orthodox. The result was the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (1993). Liberals were fully on board with this
project of congressional triumphalism, as shown by the identities of its
chief legislative sponsors. The chief sponsor in the House of
Representatives, where it passed unanimously, was Rep. Chuck Schumer.
In the Senate, where it passed by a vote of 97-3, the chief sponsor was
Senator Ted Kennedy. President Bill Clinton signed the bill into law to
great acclaim from all religious communities.
RFRA provides that “Government shall not substantially burden a
person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability” unless the government demonstrates that the policy or practice
serves a “compelling governmental interest” by the “least restrictive means”.
What amounts to a substantial burden, and by what test? How are
courts to evaluate whether a challenged policy imposes the least possible
burden on religious adherents? Is every religious claim equally weighty?
What does the Establishment Clause have to say about this hyper vigilant
protection of free exercise? These questions went unanswered; in fact,
they were scarcely raised.52
51
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But Justice Scalia’s warning came to pass. The political context in
which RFRA was deployed was transformed during the following
decades of what Michel Rosenfeld calls the “dramatic repoliticization of
religion”.53 What its sponsors intended as a shield to protect minority
religions became, instead, a sword in the hands of powerful forces
representing the religious Right and the Catholic Church. What we have
now is, indeed, a statute that permits — one might say encourages —
“every conscience to be a law unto itself”.
The Supreme Court’s Hobby Lobby decision from 2014 is the case in
point.54 The owner of a national chain of craft stores with thousands of
employees claimed entitlement under RFRA to an exemption from the
Affordable Care Act’s requirement to include contraception coverage in
the employee health insurance plan. He raised a religious objection to
certain forms of birth control that he deemed, incorrectly, to be
“abortifacients”. In an opinion by Justice Alito, the Court held by a vote
of 5 to 4 that the owner of this for-profit business was entitled to the
same accommodation the Obama administration was already offering to
religiously affiliated non-profits. (Churches themselves were completely
exempt from the contraception mandate.) The administration was giving
these religiously identified organizations the option of simply informing
the federal government of their objection to contraception coverage, at
which point the government would notify the organizations’ third-party
insurers to pick up the cost directly. Hands-off, in other words. In Hobby
Lobby, the Court held that the existence of this voluntary accommodation
by the administration demonstrated that there was a less restrictive
means, within the meaning of RFRA, to address a for-profit employer’s
religious concerns while still assuring coverage for those employees who
did not share his objections.
It is important to underscore exactly what the claim was, both here
and in the cases that followed. Obviously, no one was forcing the Hobby
Lobby owner — or, in subsequent litigation, the Little Sisters of the Poor,
an order of nuns whose chain of nursing homes both employs and serves
non-adherents55 — to buy or use birth control for themselves. Rather, the
claim was one of complicity in the sin of third parties — what Douglas
NeJaime and Reva Siegel call a complicity-based conscience claim.56
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There are two points to note about the nature and consequences of this
type of conscience claim as it has evolved. One is the increasingly
attenuated nature of these claims. Consider Kim Davis, the Kentucky
county clerk, who acted under what she called “God’s authority” when she
refused to perform her duty to issue marriage licenses to anyone legally
entitled to marry, including same-sex couples.57 That was a straightforward
complicity claim: my signature would enable your marriage.
The claims put forward in the months and years following Hobby Lobby,
however, have been much more attenuated: some employers asserted that
even submitting the opt-out form to the government made them complicit,58
while others objected to a proposed work-around by which the government
would act to assure contraception coverage even without any formal notice
at all.59 On this logic, it is difficult to say where the chain of complicity
would end. It is hard to see why an employer could not claim complicity in
sin when issuing a paycheck that a female employee of child-bearing age
might predictably use to buy birth control products.
The second point to note is the scant regard that the conscience
claimants and the Court pay to the harms suffered by third parties from
recognition of the complicity claims. While in the Hobby Lobby opinion,
Justice Alito offered the view that the decision’s effect on female
employees seeking contraception coverage “would be precisely zero”60
under the accommodation the Court identified, that has proven not to be
the case as claimants have rejected one accommodation after another,
each more generous. As Professors NeJaime and Siegel point out,
accommodation of such claims “does not entail costs borne by society as
a whole; instead, accommodation has consequences for the third parties
whose conduct is at issue”.61
57
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This became clear in the Masterpiece Cakeshop case, in which a
same-sex couple left a bakeshop empty-handed after the owner informed
them that his religious objection to same-sex marriage makes him unable
to bake a cake to be used in a celebration of their marriage.62 In other
words, the owner of a public accommodation, legally bound under
Colorado law not to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation,
claimed the conscience-driven right to be able to pick and choose his
customers, on the ground that his cake would make him complicit in
their sin. The Court decided the case in a way that sidestepped the main
issue. But other cases are in the pipeline, and will multiply in recognition
that the Supreme Court’s door is open to such claims.
The Trump administration is now testing the boundaries of
complicity-based conscience claims with a newly promulgated rule that
permits employers to refuse to cover contraception on the basis not only
of religious objections but “sincerely held moral convictions” as well.
Judge Wendy Beetlestone, granting a preliminary injunction in the
contraception litigation, marveled at the new rule’s “remarkable breadth”
and asked: “Who determines whether the expressed moral reason is
sincere or not or, for that matter, whether it falls within the bounds of
morality or is merely a preference choice?” The administration, she
observed, “has conjured up a world where a government entity is
empowered to impose its own version of morality on each one of us. . . .
That cannot be right.”63
And that cannot be civil society as we have understood it. That case,
too, will predictably come to the Supreme Court.
It may seem a stretch to draw a line from Janus to wedding cakes to
birth control. But I think all the cases I’ve mentioned present a similar
challenge to the Supreme Court, and to us. Will the Roberts Court further
accelerate the tribalizing of America or will this fractured court somehow
find a way to invoke constitutional principles that help to hold us
together, all passengers on the same boat in stormy seas?
“A democratic society cannot flourish if its citizens merely pursue
their own narrow interests,” the political philosopher Robert Audi wrote
20 years ago.64 And yet the atomistic First Amendment that the Court
appears committed to delivering is enshrining pursuit of narrow personal
interests as a constitutional right. Recall that Illinois, through its elected
62
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representatives, was perfectly free to abolish the agency fee system for
its public sector unions, but the will of the people was otherwise. It was
only in that realization that the governor turned to the courts to do his
work for him.
Civil society by definition exists outside the formal structures of
government. Judith Shklar defines citizenship in part as having “a sense
of obligation to the social environment . . . an internalized part of a
democratic order that relies on the self-direction and responsibility of its
citizens rather than on their mere obedience.”65
But neither does civil society exist apart from government, which has
the power, through law, to regulate the structures that sustain it. The
Supreme Court, in its role as “republican schoolmaster”, in Robert Dahl’s
classic phrase,66 is an indispensable partner in the ongoing project of
translating into operative law the values that vie for dominance at a given
cultural moment. When the Court moves from understanding the First
Amendment as furthering a “common cause” to enlisting it as a tool that
individuals can invoke to free themselves from the bonds of joint
enterprise, we are entering a kind of twilight of democratic legitimacy.
I will conclude with a brief discussion of recent Supreme Court
decisions that deal directly with citizenship and that are disturbing in a
different but related way: decisions dealing with voting rights. These
cases can be said to represent the other side of the same coin: not the
individual right to opt out of the bonds of citizenship, but rather a claim
to inclusion, to a right that ought to be taken for granted at this stage in
the history of our democracy but that is under sustained attack. The right
to vote has an important — indeed, an all-embracing symbolic as well as
practical dimension.
This is not the occasion to explore in depth the controversy over
Republican-driven efforts to raise the barriers to access to the polls
through, for example, requiring precise forms of voter identification that
elderly people, poor people, and members of ethnic minorities are less
likely to have or to obtain easily. The Supreme Court dealt in an
unfortunately superficial manner with the voter-ID question more than a
decade ago, when it rejected a facial challenge to one of the earliest such
efforts in a case from Indiana.67 The later 5 to 4 decision in Shelby
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County v. Holder,68 disabling the protective apparatus of section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, invites a deeper exploration than I can give it
here. Suffice to say that this was an act of extreme judicial aggression,
given that section 5 had recently been reauthorized by large bipartisan
majorities of both houses of Congress.
In 2013, the Republican-led North Carolina legislature enacted one of
the most comprehensive of the newly popular vote-suppression statutes.
The Fourth Circuit declared it unconstitutional, with Judge Diana Motz
writing for the court that the law had been passed with discriminatory
intent and reflected an effort to “target African-Americans with almost
surgical precision”.69 The Supreme Court denied the state’s petition for
certiorari.70 In a separate “statement respecting the denial of certiorari”,
Chief Justice Roberts spoke with evident regret about why the Court had
deemed itself unable to grant the state’s petition. Shortly after the state
filed its petition, a new governor and attorney general, both Democrats,
took office. The attorney general moved to dismiss the petition. The
General Assembly, still Republican-controlled, objected and moved to
intervene in order to defend the law and appeal the Fourth Circuit
decision. The question of who had authority to speak for the state was
looming, without a readily apparent answer. This is what the Chief
Justice concluded after describing the ongoing confusion:
“Given the blizzard of filings over who is and who is not authorized
to seek review in this Court under North Carolina law, it is important to
recall our frequent admonition that ‘the denial of a writ of certiorari
imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of the case.’”71
The Chief Justice’s statement was both gratuitous and revealing. He
was saying, unmistakably: I wish we could have gotten our hands on this
case, but the political mess in the state makes that impossible. By no
means, however, should anyone suppose that we approve of the Fourth
Circuit’s invalidation of this law.
At the beginning of the year, Democrats in the House of
Representatives introduced a bill they call the For the People Act of
2019, designed to increase the country’s notoriously low voter
participation by, among other measures, permitting same-day registration
and making Election Day a federal holiday. Senator Mitch McConnell,
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Republican of Kentucky and the Senate majority leader, took to the
Senate floor to denounce the bill. He called it a “power grab”.72
Making it easier to vote is a power grab? That is the point to which
the culture wars have brought us. Will the Supreme Court permit itself to
be enlisted as a combatant in the cause of protecting voting rights, or of
enabling voter suppression? In the answer to that question and to the
other questions I have raised here lies the future not only of civil society,
but of democracy itself.
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